



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

GSS SENSITIVE AF
(S/S-7506894)

early April 1975

SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO AF - AMBASSADOR DAVIS
INR - MR. HYLAND
S/P - MR. LORD

SUBJECT: Angola (S/S-7506733)

25X1 The Secretary has approved the recommendation
contained in Option 3

The Secretary
approved recommendation on Option 2 B on refugees.

Frank Ortiz

Frank Ortiz
Deputy Executive Secretary

cc: S
LSE
LPB
P
S/S

DOS Review Completed.

Win -
We had supported
Option 4. Option
3 was the agreed
AFINR position.
No one supported
Option 1 B.

(S)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION MEMORANDUM

S/S

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TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: P - Mr. Sisco *JS*
FROM: AF - Nathaniel Davis *JS*
INR - William G. Hyland *JS*
S/P - Winston Lord *JS*

Angola

I. The Problem

The shakiness of the truce between two of Angola's principal liberation movements (Zaire-based "moderate" FNLA and Marxist-oriented MPLA) has pointed up the continuing potential for widespread violence in Angola. Portugal's role in such an eventuality is uncertain. We must decide on a U.S. position in light of this situation.

At
what level, if any, should we become involved in resettling Angolan refugees returning from neighboring countries?

II. Background/Analysis

The Current Political Scene

The recent outbreak of fighting in Angola between FNLA and MPLA re-emphasized Angola's political fragility. On November 11 the Portuguese are planning to hand over power to an

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independent government, the make-up of which is still much in doubt. Three armed liberation movements are now uneasily joined in a transitional government, and are strongly tempted to settle their differences by force. Agreement on the pre-independence regime was reached in January. The recent breakdown of order was patched up with a shaky truce which established some additional ground rules. The transitional arrangements explicitly recognize the continued existence of the liberation movements' separate armed forces and, in effect, simply establish a framework for political competition.

The contenders for power are:

-- FNLA (Holden Roberto). Based on Bakongo tribal areas of northern Angola, and the strongest of the liberation movements in military terms. Its principal external patrons are Zaire and, to a lesser extent, the PRC. Roberto is a "moderate" in the sense of being a pragmatist who is willing to take aid from anyone, but he also has been accused of being "racist" (anti-white) and "tribalist."

-- MPLA (Agostinho Neto). Strongest in urban areas, with an appeal to intellectuals, but inferior to FNLA in military strength. The MPLA is radical and Marxist in orientation, and has long received Soviet aid. As in African parties of similar orientation, however, the depth of the MPLA's Marxist commitment and its foreign policy significance is difficult to measure.

MPLA sympathizers largely control the media and are responsible for the tone and content of its product. Highly unflattering stories of FNLA atrocities are already an element in the international perception of Angolan developments. (Attachment)

-- UNITA (Jonas Savimbi). The least known movement, but perhaps the one with potentially the most popular support, because of its strong base

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among the Ovimbundu of the central highlands. UNITA is militarily the weakest of the three, but Savimbi is a skillful politician who has recently been moving closer to FNLA; he is unlikely to accept a permanent secondary role, however. Savimbi is a pragmatist, with no apparent deep ideological commitments and of varied past political associations, who wants to win. He has characterized himself as a "moderate African socialist."

-- The Portuguese. Presumably a factor of diminishing influence, although their role will be of major importance until independence. They have shown a bias toward MPLA in the past but their major interest is to disengage from Angola. By the end of April their troop strength should be down to 24,000. Portuguese settlers (about 350,000), once politically potent, now seem to have no choice but to leave or throw in their lot with the liberation movements. Many, possibly a majority, favor UNITA.

Prospects

The recent clashes in Luanda may have been intended by FNLA as a show of force to impress Portuguese officials and the MPLA and to improve FNLA's security and bargaining positions. Alternatively, they may have been the first move in an attempt to destroy the MPLA's military capacity. In either case, the fighting illustrated the continuing willingness of the parties to use force to improve or defend their relative power positions.

In general, the outlook appears to be as follows:

-- Further fighting in Angola is probably inevitable and there is a high risk of prolonged (though possibly spasmodic) violence.

-- There is still a chance--however slim--that the struggle for power in Angola

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will be political rather than military. The willingness of the three movements to submerge their differences long enough to negotiate the Alvor agreement with Portugal was a major achievement. Last week's cease-fire agreement, with the implied intention of both sides to try once again, is another in the series of Portuguese initiatives that have so far held off uncontrolled violence. If that violence can be forestalled until the political process is set in motion, elections might result in an FNLA-UNITA alliance which might hold together long enough to permit a relatively peaceful post-independence political evolution.

-- The Portuguese probably still hope to effect some kind of peaceful transition, but are likely to limit their role. They are probably willing to continue to act as middleman and mediator. They are probably unwilling to enforce order through sustained use of their own forces, which might prove unreliable in any case. Lisbon apparently has considered inviting the UN to perform some kind of peacekeeping (or observing) role, in order to hasten its own disengagement. In any case the Portuguese are not expected to remain involved after independence.

-- If civil war breaks out, and barring outside intervention, the FNLA may have the military force to defeat MPLA. The Portuguese could reverse the balance if they intervened on MPLA's side, but their willingness to do so is doubtful.

-- In a prolonged conflict between the two movements, each would probably have to have foreign military assistance. Civil disorder,

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therefore, will tend to draw in outsiders, although the extent and effect of such involvement is not foreseeable at this point.

-- Roberto would probably approach Mobutu, the PRC and the U. S. Since Mobutu's ability to provide substantial additional equipment to the FNLA may be inhibited by his deteriorating economic situation, he would probably facilitate a request to the PRC, which has already provided significant training and equipment to Roberto's recruits in Zaire. Neto will probably turn to the USSR. The USSR, most probably, would provide assistance but will attempt to keep its involvement indirect to avoid any prejudice to its delicately balanced policy toward Portugal.

-- Outside influence could affect developments in Angola in other ways. Zaire is a key actor; Mobutu would undoubtedly play an important role. Cabinda could be a major irritant in Angola's relations with its neighbors.

-- Prolonged civil strife might trigger an African peacekeeping effort or an UN-sponsored effort that would be heavily influenced and monitored by the OAU countries. The Portuguese already have raised with Secretary General Waldheim the possibility of a UN observer or peacekeeping role in Angola. Such intervention presumably would have to recognize a special role for countries in the region, e.g., Zaire, Congo, Zambia, and Tanzania.

III. Problem of Refugees

One area in which increased U.S. activity has been proposed by Ambassador Hinton is in helping to resettle refugees in Angola. Over a half a million are now living outside

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their country. The UN is now developing a program which, if the Portuguese Government and the three nationalist movements comprising the Angolan transitional government concur, will help bring them back. Most of them are now in Zaire, and most of these are believed to sympathize with Holden Roberto's FNLA.

Ambassador Hinton strongly favors overt U.S. assistance in the refugee effort and has proposed that this take two forms: 1) a U.S. contribution to an international resettlement program headed by the UN inside Angola; and 2) unilateral U.S. assistance (e.g., trucks) to transport refugees living in Zaire and other neighboring countries back to Angola. He argues that the latter program will enhance the political fortunes of the "moderate" FNLA by facilitating the return of several hundred thousand of its adherents in time to register for Angolan elections scheduled for October--something the cumbersome UN machinery cannot accomplish. While Mobutu would probably like to help Roberto return at least some of the refugees, Zaire's tight financial situation makes it difficult for him to do so on a decisive scale. Further, movement of refugees in the numbers suggested would create serious problems of assimilation upon their return.

IV. U.S. Interests in Angola

Angola is the most economically promising of Portugal's African territories. It is sub-Saharan Africa's second largest oil producer, the world's fourth largest coffee producer, and

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is a major exporter of diamonds, cotton and iron ore. U.S. investment totals about \$400 million, including some \$300 million by Gulf Oil in Cabinda. Gulf produces over 150,000 barrels a day, half of which is exported to the U. S. Several other American oil companies have promising concessions in off-shore areas south of Luanda.

Regional and strategic interests must also be considered. Events in Angola affect not only southern Africa but central Africa as well, where Zaire in particular, as well as the Congo and Zambia, are involved with contending Angolan political movements. Zaire and Zambia have significant economic ties with the territory.

Our strategic interests are marginal. U.S. naval vessels on rotation to and from COMIDEASTFOR have found it convenient to call at Angola ports for bunkering and ship visits. While these calls have been infrequent (last year there were four), the limited availability of other ports of call in southern Africa, and our reluctance for political reasons to call at South African ports, make it desirable for us to continue to be able to call in Angola.

V. Alleged U.S. Role in Angola

The United States has long been accused of interference in Angolan internal affairs. Even when we were being wrongly charged with aiding Portugal's military effort there, we were concurrently alleged to have been helping at least one of the nationalist groups (FNLA) to the detriment of the others. For its part, Gulf Oil has been accused of political manipulation in Cabinda.

Since decolonization began, these charges have proliferated. Even well-meaning states like

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Zambia (which has played an otherwise constructive role) have cautioned the U. S. and Gulf against dabbling in Angolan politics. Ranking members of the Portuguese Government apparently believe we are supporting the FNLA. On March 27 a member of Portugal's Revolutionary Council told a U.S. official that the recent fighting in Angola showed a clear pattern of foreign intervention, adding that Portugal would not tolerate such interference. His clear intimation was that the U. S. is supporting the FNLA.

VI. Actual U.S. Role

We have consistently maintained a public posture of non-interference in Angola's affairs.

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Option 2:

Overtly Assist in Repatriating Angolan Refugees.

A. Unilaterally provide trucks, relief supplies, etc., to move refugees back to Angola in time to register for elections. (Ambassador Hinton's proposal):

Pro:

-- Would bolster Roberto's chances for gaining political power through elections.

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- Would increase our influence with Roberto.
- Would please Mobutu.
- Would avoid the cumbersome UN mechanism for refugee resettlement and possible obstruction of a UN effort by the MPLA and/or Portugal.

Con:

- Would compromise US posture of impartiality and noninterference among Angolan factions.
- Would require very substantial inputs to assure refugees were adequately cared for once they returned to Angola.
- Might encourage Roberto to resist cooperation with other Angolan factions.
- Could increase chances of forceful reaction by MPLA and thereby increase chances of civil war.
- Could serve as pretext or inducement for other powers (e.g., Soviets, Portuguese) to increase aid to MPLA.
- Might not be liked by UNITA, thus lessening our favor and influence with Angola's other moderate faction.
- Would be logistically difficult and expensive to mount a meaningful program in short time available.

B. Contribute to a longer-term UN refugee relief/resettlement program in Angola.

Pro:

- Would help "moderate" forces of FNLA more than other Angolan elements, but under UN cover.

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- Would probably be acceptable to other Angolan factions, including elements of MPLA, and to Portuguese as well.
- Would limit risk of political over-exposure, and preserve US public posture of noninterference and impartiality.
- Might induce other governments to make similar contributions.

Con:

- Would be long-term process that would not do much to meet Roberto's immediate pre-election needs.
- Would have less favorable impact on our relations with Roberto and Mobutu than would unilateral US effort, since our assistance would be submerged in international program.
- Might in any case be blocked or seriously impeded by MPLA, with or without Portuguese help.

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ACTION AF-06

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-10 ISO-00 OMB-01 PM-03 NSC-05 SP-02

SS-15 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 PA-01 USIA-06

PRS-01 SAM-01 L-02 SCCT-01 SY-05 OPR-02 H-02 A-01

USSS-00 /084 W

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R 030845Z APR 75
FM AMCONSUL LUANDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3381
INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMCONSUL LOURENCO MARQUES
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
CINCLANT FOR POLAD
CINCEUR FOR PULAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 LUANDA 0352

E.O. 11652: GUS
TAGS: MILI PINT PDEV AD
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF LUANDA VIOLENCE

1. SUMMARY. FNLA AND MPLA ACCUSE EACH OTHER OF PROVOKING THE RECENT WAVE OF VIOLENCE IN LUANDA THAT TOOK OVER 200 LIVES. FNLA PERFORMED BADLY IN ITS ATTEMPTS TO TEACH MPLA A LESSON, AND MANY INNOCENT PEOPLE WERE KILLED OR HURT. FNLA HAS BEEN EQUALLY INEPT IN ITS PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORTS SINCE THE CLASHES. THE PROSPECT IS FOR CONTINUED VIOLENCE IN LUANDA, BUT CIVIL WAR IS NOT IMMINENT. END SUMMARY.

2. IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE VIOLENCE IN LUANDA MPLA FERVOR AMONG GHETTO DWELLERS IS AT A HIGH PITCH AND STORIES ABOUND OF

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FNIA ATROCITIES. MPLA HAS MADE THE MOST OF THE SITUATION BY TAKING REPORTERS TO SEE SOME OF THE VICTIMS AND HAS ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE GIVING ITS SIDE OF THE STORY (SEPTEL). MPLA MAINTAINS THAT FAR FROM PROVOKING, IT HAS BEEN THE VICTIM OF MANY PROVOKATIONS. FNIA, MEANWHILE, HAS MADE AN EFFORT TO PUT OUT ITS SIDE OF THE STORY, BUT HAS SHOWN ITSELF TO BE INEPT AT PUBLIC RELATIONS. PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL MEMBER JOHNNY EDUARDO TOLD THE FOREIGN PRESS ON APRIL TWO THAT FNIA WILL NOT TOLERATE LIES ABOUT ITS ACTIVITIES (HE MEANT STORIES ABOUT MASSACRES) AND THAT IT HAS THE FORCE TO EXPEL ANY OFFENDER FROM ANGOLA. EDUARDO CAME ACROSS TO THE LARGELY UNSYMPATHETIC AUDIENCE AS SOMETHING OF A GOON. HE SAID, "WE ARE NOT MAKING THREATS, WE ARE TELLING YOU HOW IT WILL BE."

3. MPLA HAS TOLD ME THAT THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE MASSACRED NEAR CAXITO WAS SEVENTY, AND THAT A NUMBER OF OTHERS ESCAPED, WHILE OTHERS WERE WOUNDED. MPLA DENIES ROUNDINGUP GHETTO DWELLERS AND ACCUSES FNIA OF BREAKING INTO MANY HOMES TO SEARCH FOR EVIDENCE THAT THE INHABITANTS SYMPATHIZED WITH THE MPLA. SUSPECTS WERE ARRESTED, BEATEN AND IN SOME CASES KILLED. FNIA IS ALSO ACCUSED OF KILLING INNOCENT PEOPLE THROUGH INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS ON THE GHETTOS WITH MORTARS, BAZOOKAS AND GRENADES. THE NUMBER OF DEAD IS STILL NOT KNOWN, BUT THE POPULAR PERCEPTION IS THAT MANY HUNDRES HAVE BEEN KILLED. I HAVE HEARD ESTIMATES RANGING FROM FIVE HUNDRED TO TWO THOUSAND. ONE SOURCE WHO CLAIMS TO HAVE VISITED THE MORGUES AND HOSPITALS USES A FIGURE OF 350 DEAD. THE FIGURE USED BY THE MPLA IS 200. SOME REPORTS SPEAK OF THE METHOD USED DURING THE 1961 SLAUGHTER IN NORTHERN ANGOLA WHEN BODIES WERE DISMEMBERED, THE STOMACHS SLIT OPEN AND THE LIMBS INSERTED IN THE CAVITY AS A WARNING. A PORTUGUESE NEWSPAPER THE OTHER DAY CARRIED A STORY WITH THE HEADLINE THAT "UPA IS BACK," A REFERENCE TO FNIA'S FORMER NAME. JOHNNY EDUARDO TOLD REPORTERS THAT UPA HAS INDEED RETURNED AND THAT FNIA IS NOT ASHAMED OF THE NAME. THOSE KILLED BY UPA IN 1961 WERE ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE - EXPLOITERS. IN WAR PEOPLE ARE GOING TO BE KILLED.

4. WHATEVER THE FACTS, MANY HAVE DIED AND FEELINGS OF RAGE, FEAR, AND FRUSTRATION EXIST IN THE GHETTOS. THE FACADE OF COOPERATION AT THE TOP LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT IS GONE, TO BE REPLACED BY OPEN HOSTILITY AND SHOUTING MATCHES AT MEETINGS. NO PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TOWARD FULFILLING THE MARCH 28 AGREEMENT TO RELEASE PRISONERS, DISARM CIVILIANS AND WITHDRAW EXCESS

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TROOPS FROM LUANDA. MPLA SAYS THAT ITS PRISONS ARE OPEN FOR INSPECTION AND THAT IT STANDS READY TO LET THE PRISONERS GO ANY TIME FNLA DECIDES TO COOPERATE. JOHNNY EDUARDO SAID ON APRIL 2 THAT FNLA WILL NOT BEGIN AN EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS UNTIL MPLA RELEASES MIGUEL SEBASTIAO, BROTHER OF JOSE PEDRO, WHOM MPLA EXECUTED DURING THE VIOLENCE. FNLA CLAIMS MPLA IS AFRAID TO RELEASE HIM BECAUSE HE KNOWS TOO MUCH ABOUT MPLA ATROCITIES.

5. ON THE QUESTION OF THE ORIGINS OF THE VIOLENCE, FNLA CLAIMS IT WAS GOADED TO ACTION BY THE CONSTANT PROVOCATIONS OF MPLA. THIS IS A CERTAINLY TRUE IN THE BROAD SENSE; MPLA HAS GIVEN FNLA CAUSE MORE THAN ONCE TO TAKE REPRISALS. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, THAT FNLA MADE A DECISION TO ACT ON MARCH 22-23. FNLA HAS BEEN SAYING FOR WEEKS, IF NOT MONTHS, THAT UNLESS MPLA CEASED ITS PROVOCATIONS IT WOULD HAVE TO ACT. THE MORE TIME THAT WENT BY WITHOUT FNLA ACTION, THE MORE ITS LEADERS MUST HAVE FELT THEY WERE EARNING THE IMAGE OF PAPER TIGERS. I IMAGINE THEY LET THEIR FRUSTRATIONS GET THE BETTER OF THEIR JUDGMENT.

6. IN ONE SENSE FNLA PROBABLY CAME OUT THE LOSER FROM THIS LATEST ROUND OF VIOLENCE. FNLA TROOPS DID NOT DISTINGUISH THEMSELVES BY THEIR ABILITY TO SEEK STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND HOLD THEM, NOR DID THE ORGANIZATION SEEM TO HAVE ANY OBJECTIVE OTHER THAN TO KILL AS MANY MPLA ELEMENTS AS POSSIBLE. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN ALL THEY WANTED TO DO, BUT MPLA IRREGULARS SEEMED ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS TO HAVE THE UPPER HAND AND FNLA WAS REDUCED TO FITS OF RAGE AND WILD ASSAULTS ON ANYONE IN SIGHT. THE GHETTOS PROVED TO BE HOSTILE TERRITORY FOR FNLA AND IN WHICH ITS FORCES BLUNDERED ABOUT TRYING VAINLY TO SNUFF OUT RESISTANCE. MPLA SENTIMENT, ALWAYS STRONG IN LUANDA'S GHETTOS, HAS BEEN REINFORCED BY THE ACTIONS OF FNLA TROOPS. FNLA THREATS TO BRING MASSIVE FORCES TO BEAR IN THE EVENT OF FUTURE TROUBLE HAVE A BRAVE RING, BUT I DOUBT THEY WOULD BE CAPABLE ENTIRELY OF WIPING OUT RESISTANCE, AND THEY MUST REALIZE THAT THIS IS THE CASE. STILL, THEIR STATED STRATEGY AT THE MOMENT IS THE APPLICATION OF EVEN GREATER FORCE UNTIL MPLA NO LONGER REPRESENTS A THREAT TO FNLA'S FREEDOM OF OPERATIONS AND JUST AS IMPORTANT, CEASES TO INSULT THE FNLA LEADERSHIP. IF THE FNLA GOAL WAS TO INSTILL FEAR IN THE POPULACE, THEY SUCCEEDED. IF THEY RULED ALONE FEAR WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO KEEP THE POPULATION UNDER CONTROL. UNFORTUNATELY

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FOR FNLA, THEY DO NOT HAVE ALL POWER AND AT SOME POINT IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AFTER THE SENSE OF TERROR PASSES, WE CAN EXPECT MORE SMALL SCALE ATTACKS BY MPLA ACTIVISTS.

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ACTION AF-06

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-10 ISO-00 OMB-01 PM-03 NSC-05 SP-02

SS-15 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 PA-01 USIA-06

PRS-01 SAM-01 L-02 SCTT-01 SY-05 OPR-02 H-02 A-01

USSS-00 /084 W

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R 030845Z APR 75
FM AMCONSUL LUANDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3382
INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMCONSUL LOURENCO MARQUES
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 LUANDA 00352

7. MPLA, FOR ITS PART, IS FRIGHTENED. THEY HAVE SEEN WHAT IS IN STORE FOR THEM IN THE EVENT OF RENEWED HOSTILITIES AND ALTHOUGH THEY CAN COUNT ON THE SUPPORT OF HUNDREDS, PERHAPS THOUSANDS, OF GUERRILLA FIGHTERS IN THE SLUMS, THEY ARE ALSO AWARE THAT MUCH OF THE LEADERSHIP WOULD BE WIPE OUT. AGOSTINHO NETO'S HASTY DEPARTURE FOR EUROPE A FEW DAYS AGO MUST BE ATTRIBUTED TO FEARS FOR HIS PERSONAL SAFETY. THE MPLA CENTRAL COMMITTEE COMMUNIQUE OF MARCH 30, PUBLISHED ON APRIL 2, REITERATES THE STANDARD ANTI-IMPERIALIST WASH AND ADOPTS A TOUGH LINE, BUT AT THE VERY END APPEARS A CALL FOR A NEW SUMMIT MEETING OF THE THREE PRESIDENTS OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS.

8. WITH RESPECT TO INTRA-MPLA DIFFERENCES, THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED, AT LEAST FOR THE SHORT RUN, BECAUSE THE RANK AND FILE PERCEIVE AN IMMEDIATE THREAT AND WILL SUPPORT CON-

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FRONTATION AT ALL LEVELS. FOR THE LONGER TERM, THE PROSPECTS OF THE ANDRADE FACTIONS, OR ACTIVE REVOLT, TO RESUME ACTIVITY IN THE MPLA ARE ENHANCED AND THE CURRENT CONFUSION OFFERS THE HIGH COMMISSIONER A CHANCE TO TRY AND NEGOTIATE THEIR REENTRY INTO THE PARTY LEADERSHIP. THEY SEEM UNSUITED TO THE ROUGH AND TUMBLE OF ANGOLAN LIBERATION POLITICS, HOWEVER, AND NO ONE HAS HAD MUCH SUCCESS IN GETTING THEM TO TAKE ANY INITIATIVES.

9. THERE EXISTS THE THESIS HERE THAT MPLA, EMBOLDENED BY THE TURN OF THE LEFT IN PORTUGAL (LUANDA 0303), INCREASED ITS EFFORTS TO PROVOKE A VIOLENT CONFRONTATION WITH THE HOPE OF GAINING TWO THINGS: THE REMOVAL OF THE TOO IMPARTIAL HIGH COMMISSIONER AND A REVISION OF THE ALVOR AGREEMENT. ACCORDING TO THIS THEORY, MPLA MILITARY COMMANDER IKU CARRERA RETURNED FROM LISBON WITH THE BAD NEWS THAT THE MPLA COULD EXPECT NO SUPPORT FROM THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT AND THAT THE PORTUGUESE TROOPS IN ANGOLA WOULD NOT COME IN ON THEIR SIDE. DESPITE THIS REPORT, OR PERHAPS BECAUSE OF IT, THE MPLA LEADERSHIP DECIDED TO SET OFF A WAVE OF VIOLENCE WITH THE IDEA OF FORCING THE PORTUGUESE TO TAKE A HAND IN MATTERS. THEY HOPED THROUGH THE CREATION OF A CHAOTIC SITUATION TO WIN A NEW HIGH COMMISSIONER, WHO COULD NOT BE ANY WORSE FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW, NO MATTER WHO HE WAS, THAN GENERAL CARDOSO. THEY MIGHT ALSO BE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE A POSTPONEMENT OF ELECTIONS FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, IN WHICH THEY BELIEVE THEY WOULD MAKE A POOR SHOWING. IF THEY CAN BRING THE OTHER PARTIES TO THE ALVOR AGREEMENT TO THE BARGAINING TABLE, THE REASONING GOES, THEY WILL MAKE SOME CONCESSIONS IN RETURN FOR THEIR DEMANDS. THEY WOULD COUNT ON PORTUGUESE SUPPORT TO ACHIEVE THIS END. MPLA MIGHT, FOR INSTANCE GIVE UP THE ORGANIZATIONS KNOWN AS POPULAR POWER, WHICH IS ANATHEMA TO FNLA AND WHICH IS THE BASE OF MPLA PARAMILITARY SUPPORT IN THE GHETOS. THE CONCESSION WOULD BE MEANINGLESS, AS THE BASE WILL REMAIN INTACT UNDER ANY NAME. IF THE FNLA AGREES TO A POSTPONEMENT OF THE ELECTIONS,

IT IS SAID, UNITA WILL GO ALONG IN ORDER NOT TO STYMIE A SETTLEMENT. EVEN IF NO SUCH MPLA PLAN EXISTS, THE RESULTS OF ALL THAT HAS GONE ON MAY WELL BE A CHANGE IN THE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH ANGOLA WILL MOVE TOWARD INDEPENDENCE. THE ONLY WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE WILL BE NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH EACH SIDE WILL AGREE TO GIVE UP SOMETHING. FOREIGN MINISTER MELO ANTUNES IS DUE TO RETURN TO LUANDA APRIL 3 TO LEND A HAND. HE WAS QUOTED IN TANZANIA AS SAYING HE WOULD RETURN TO LUANDA BECAUSE THE TRUCE HE HELPED NEGOTIATE

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"WAS NOT WORKING VERY WELL."

10 ONE OF THE DANGERS NOW, ASIDE FROM A REPETITION OF THE FNLA/ MPLA CLASHES, IS MOB VIOLENCE BY MPLA ACTIVISTS AGAINST WHITES AND THEIR BUSINESSES. FNLA IS IDENTIFIED WITH WHITE INTERESTS IN THE MINDS OF MPLA ADHERENTS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF DESTRUCTIVE ACTIVITY IN THE EUROPEAN SECTORS OF LUANDA IS NOW GREATER THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE PAST. SOME FNLA OFFICIALS HAVE MOVED INTO NEIGHBORHOODS WHERE MANY FOREIGNERS, INCLUDING CONSULATE PERSONNEL, LIVE AND THE DANGER OF PHYSICAL HARM TO EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS HAS RISEN CORRESPONDINGLY.

11. CIVIL WAR IS ON EVERYONE'S MIND, BUT THE RISK IS PROBABLY NOT MUCH HIGHER NOW THAN IT HAS BEEN THESE PAST FEW MONTHS AND DESPITE THE CHARGED ATMOSPHERE A GENERALIZED ARMED CONFLICT IS NOT IMMINENT. NEITHER MPLA NOR UNITA HAVE LARGE CONTINGENTS OF ARMED TROOPS. BOTH ORGANIZATIONS HAVE MANY RECRUITS IN TRAINING, BUT THEY DO NOT CONSTITUTE EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCES. FNLA HAS THE TROOPS, BUT LACKS THE ABILITY TO TRANSPORT THEM QUICKLY AND IN LARGE NUMBERS. THE POLITICAL COCKPIT WAS AND IS LUANDA. IT IS HERE THAT MPLA HAS DEMONSTRABLE MILITARY AND PARA MILITARY POWER AND IT IS HERE THAT MPLA WILL ASSERT ITSELF. MPLA'S BEST CHANCE TO NEUTRALIZE FNLA'S MILITARY MIGHT AND UNITA'S ELECTORAL STRENGTH IS TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE INSTITUTIONS IN THE SOCIETY - KEY MINISTRIES, LABOR, THE MEDIA, BANKS, TO NAME A FEW - AND THE PRINCIPAL BATTLEFIELD FOR THIS STRUGGLE WILL BE LUANDA. MPLA CANNOT AND DOES NOT WANT TO FIGHT A CIVIL WAR; UNITA'S POLICY TO WIN POWER INCLUDES EVERY STRATEGY BUT CIVIL WAR. FNLA OFFICIALS CONSTANTLY TELL ME THAT IF PUSHED TOO FAR THEIR STRATEGY WILL BE TO ASSUME INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS IN AS MANY AREAS OF THE COUNTRY AS NECESSARY. THE LESSON THEY LEARNED IN LUANDA DURING THE LAST DAYS OF MARCH IS THAT ENUNCIATION OF THE POLICY IS EASIER THAN THE EXECUTION. THE OUTLOOK IS FOR CONTINUED TENSION AND RECURRING VIOLENCE IN LUANDA.

KILLORAN

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